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HATE SPEECH AND DOUBLE STANDARDS
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Michael O. Sawyer Chair of  Constitutional Law and Politics
Maxwell School of  Citizenship and Public Affairs
Syracuse University
ABSTRACT
Many European states ban the public expression of  hateful speech directed at ra-
cial and religious minorities, and an increasing number do so for anti-gay speech 
as well. These laws have been subjected to a wide range of  legal, philosophical, 
and empirical investigation, but this paper explores one potential cost that has not 
received much attention in the literature. Statutory bans on hate speech leave dem-
ocratic societies with a Hobson’s choice. If  those societies ban incitements of  ha-
tred against some vulnerable groups, they will inevitably face parallel demands for 
protection of  other such groups. If  they accede to those demands, they will impose 
an ever- tightening vice on incontrovertible free expression values; if  they do not, 
they will send clear signals of  unequal citizenship to those groups excluded from the 
laws’ protection. This paper elaborates this dilemma via exploration of  a range of  
contemporary European legal responses to homophobic and Islamophobic speech.
KEYWORDS:  Hate Speech, Freedom of  Speech, Civil Liberties, Islamaphobia, Homophobia
IN MARCH 2015, an English court convicted street preacher Michael Overd un-
der the Public Order Act for publicly quoting Leviticus 20:13 in the course of  
denouncing homosexuality as sinful, while simultaneously acquitting him (under 
the same Act) for characterizing the Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him) as 
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a pedophile (Bingham 2015).1 Overd’s conviction was subsequently quashed, but 
the initial holding illustrates a central dilemma of  the European approach to hate 
speech regulation. Statutory bans on hate speech leave democratic societies with 
a Hobson’s choice. If  those societies ban incitements of  hatred against some vul-
nerable groups, they will inevitably face parallel demands for protection of  other 
such groups. If  they accede to those demands, they will impose an ever- tightening 
vice on incontrovertible free expression values; if  they do not, they will send clear 
signals of  unequal citizenship to those groups who are excluded from the laws’ 
protection. The Overd trial calls attention to the democratic costs on both sides of  
this dilemma. Once England had banned public expression of  racial and religious 
hatred, it faced a compelling case for doing the same with anti-gay hatred. Indeed, 
a growing number of  European states have regulated such speech acts, sending an 
important message of  equal citizenship to European gays and lesbians, but with 
the significant cost of  infringing on core exercises of  religious speech. Meanwhile, 
most European states have refrained from banning certain widespread forms of  
Islamophobic speech, thereby signaling to many European Muslims that they are 
not yet equal citizens.
THE HATE SPEECH DEBATE
In the second half  of  the twentieth century, European legislatures repeatedly 
banned the public expression of  some forms of  hateful speech, and international 
lawyers drafted multiple treaties, conventions, and resolutions calling on signatory 
states to adopt similar bans (Bleich 2011, 19–22; Heinze 2009). As Eric Heinze has 
noted, “[a]ll Western European states have [such] . . . bans . . . [and they all] share 
some core similarities, particularly insofar as they incorporate international and Eu-
ropean norms requiring or authorizing bans on some forms of  expression” (2007, 
296). Despite this “common core of  norms” (again quoting Heinze 2007, 296), 
these European hate speech laws vary across two key dimensions. First, some stat-
utes ban only incitement to violence against members of  vulnerable groups, while 
1. The June 2014 public statement for which Overd was convicted was: “If  a man sleeps with a man, 
they have both committed an abomination.” The July 2014 public statement for which he was acquit-
ted was: “Noone has salvation unless you have Jesus Christ. You claim heaven on the back of  Buddha, 
you’re going straight to hell. You claim heaven and paradise on the back of  the teachings of  Islam, 
you’re hell bound. If  you believe the Prophet Mohammed was truly a prophet, you’re hell bound. He’s 
a liar and deceiver just like you and me folks. He had a wife at the age of  nine. In this country that’s 
paedophilia. That’s a wicked immorality to have sex with a girl at the age of  nine.” Both statements 
were delivered with the aid of  a megaphone in Taunton Centre. 
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others reach more broadly in banning incitement to hatred and/or discrimination, 
and others more broadly still in banning group-based defamation, degradation, 
or abuse. Second, some limit their coverage to racist speech, while others include 
speech that is hateful on additional grounds such as religion or sexual orientation. 
Virtually all of  these regulations have faced legal challenges based on constitutional 
or quasi- constitutional free expression principles, but European judges have by and 
large upheld them in both their narrower and their broader forms, though particu-
lar applications have sometimes been enjoined.2
Meanwhile, in the 1980s and ’90s, critical race theorists in U.S. law schools 
endorsed and elaborated the European arguments in support of  hate speech bans, 
making a case for their migration to U.S. law. In a series of  influential essays—the 
most notable of  which were reprinted in a 1993 edited volume that continues to 
be widely cited—Richard Delgado, Charles R. Lawrence III, and Mari J. Matsuda 
argued that racist hate speech, considered from the victims’ perspective, has the ca-
pacity to inflict injuries on members of  vulnerable minority groups. As such, judges 
should balance the constitutional values of  free expression and equal protection 
against one another, and the latter should often win out (Delgado 1982; Lawrence 
1990; Matsuda 1989; Matsuda, et al. 1993; see also Delgado and Stefancic 2004).
In 2009, Jeremy Waldron built on these arguments in a widely noted set of  
Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School, subsequently revised and published as 
The Harm in Hate Speech (2012). In this book, Waldron’s key move is to define hate 
speech as a form of  group defamation and to compare the libel of  members of  
vulnerable minority groups with other forms of  libel that are (or have been) heavily 
regulated in many legal systems. With regard to seditious libel, for example, Wal-
dron notes that we stopped regulating such speech in the United States and Britain 
when we realized that the state was not so vulnerable as to need such protection. 
Since racial and religious minorities remain pretty vulnerable in many democratic 
societies, hate speech regulations—understood as prohibitions on group libel—may 
be more justifiable. On Waldron’s account, prohibitions on libelous statements di-
rected against individual members of  vulnerable minorities are important compo-
nents of  salutary legislative efforts to combat discrimination against such minorities. 
Waldron builds here on U.S.based critical race theory, but his primary interest is 
in defending the legitimacy of  hate speech statutes in Europe. As he notes, these 
2. Note, for example, Jersild v. Denmark, Application no. 15890/89 (ECtHR 1994), in which the 
European Court of  Human Rights affirmed convictions of  the members of  an extremist group who 
appeared in a televised interview, though it reversed the conviction of  the Danish journalist who in-
terviewed them.
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statutes often use the language of  group libel or defamation and are often located 
within broader statutory regulations of  discrimination (Waldron 2012, 39–40).
Waldron repeatedly emphasizes that the goal of  these statutes is not to protect 
people from offense, but to protect them from published assaults on their dignity, 
which ought to be understood as harms to society as a whole as well as to the indi-
vidual targets of  the hateful speech acts (2012, 105–130). In his words, “to protect 
people from offense or from being offended is to protect them from a certain sort 
of  effect on their feelings. And that is different from protecting their dignity and 
the assurance of  their decent treatment in society” (2012, 107). In Waldron’s view, 
“[t]he key to the matter is not to try to extirpate offense, but to drive a wedge be-
tween offense and harm, while at the same time maintaining an intelligent rather 
than a primitive view of  what it is for a vulnerable person to be harmed in these 
circumstances” (2012, 129–30).
Waldron’s defense of  hate speech bans has been challenged on a number of  
grounds, including the conventional civil libertarian conviction that democratic 
governments should rarely be allowed to silence speech acts on the basis of  their 
viewpoint (Baker 2012; Dworkin 2009, 2012; K. Malik 2012). We are sure to-
day—most of  us—that racism is intolerable, but were 1950s Americans—most of  
them—any less sure that Communism was intolerable? Giving ourselves leeway 
to ban speech that we know to do more harm than good may well provide similar 
leeway to our progeny to ban speech that they know to be equally harmful. And 
if  history is any guide, some such certainties will prove mistaken in the end. Most 
civil libertarians do not worry that our current conviction that racism is intolerable 
will turn out to be mistaken, but nor do they trust the leaders of  present and future 
democratic states to mark out additional categories of  intolerable speech. Likewise, 
many civil libertarians consider homophobia just as intolerable as racism, but it 
is clear that a substantial portion of  the world’s population disagrees with them. 
Whenever LGBT rights advocates persuade enough people in any given society to 
their view of  the matter, they can outlaw the public expression of  homophobic as 
well as racist speech. But why would religious believers who denounce homosexuals 
as sinners think of  such bans as anything other than efforts by the state to silence 
their unpopular views?
Moreover, even within the core of  ostensible consensus that racism is intoler-
able, significant questions of  application arise. French prosecutors and judges are 
convinced that the statutory ban on provocation of  “discrimination, hatred or vio-
lence toward a person or group of  people on grounds of  their origin, their belong-
ing or their not belonging to an ethnic group, a nation, a race or a certain religion” 
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authorizes criminal prosecution for peaceful advocacy of  sanctions against Israel.3 
Needless to say, this view is not universally held. On the basis of  such applications, 
a number of  critics have challenged Waldron’s account by emphasizing that in ac-
tual practice, hate speech bans often sweep too broadly into the realm of  legitimate 
political speech (Greenwald 2015b; Heinze 2006). Others have emphasized that 
such bans tend to draw further attention to the speech that they are attempting 
to silence; to be disproportionately used against the very minority groups whom 
they are ostensibly designed to protect; to encourage social groups to prosecute dis-
agreements amongst one another in court, thereby increasing inter- group hostility; 
and to be unnecessary and hence “inappropriate for democratic societies that are 
sufficiently stable, mature and prosperous to be able to protect internal security 
and vulnerable individuals through other means, without having to ban ideas from 
public deliberation” (Heinze 2007, 298–99; see also Ahdar and Leigh 2005, 385–6; 
Baker 2012, 72–79; Greene 2012; Weinstein 1999). On this last point, the appro-
priateness of  hate speech bans might be analogized to the use of  military courts to 
try civilians. Such courts may sometimes be necessary in an immediate theater of  
war, but as the U.S. Supreme Court has held, they are of  dubious legitimacy when 
and where civilian courts remain open and operating.4 Likewise, where a robust 
sphere of  speech by government and civil society is able to effectively counter the 
public expression of  hateful speech, the case for statutory bans on such speech 
seems weaker. In light of  both the principled and pragmatic critiques that have 
been raised against hate speech regulation, Corey Brettschneider has argued that 
democratic states should not use their coercive capacities to silence hateful speech, 
but should use their expressive and funding capacities to counter and discourage it 
(2012; see also Heinze 2006, 578–81; 2013).
Some careful empirical scholars have dismissed the pragmatic concerns with 
hate speech bans as overstated (Bleich 2011; Gelber and McNamara 2015; see 
also Parekh 2012), but one argument that has not received adequate attention is 
that such laws “inevitably create two tiers of  citizens—those who are protected 
from offensive speech, and those left unprotected from equally offensive speech” 
(Heinze 2006, 555).5 As a result of  such distinctions, hate speech regulations some-
times send signals of  unequal citizenship to relatively powerless groups who are 
3. Appeal no. 1480020 (Court of  Cassation, Criminal Chamber 2015).
4. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
5. In a thoughtful summary of, and response to, six standard arguments against hate speech bans, 
Bhikhu Parekh does not mention this one (2012, 47–54).
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not included within the scope of  their protection. That is, the legal protection of  
some vulnerable minorities from abusive speech is itself  a message of  unequal sta-
tus directed toward other vulnerable minorities who do not receive such protec-
tion. Moreover, this defect is inextricable from the grounds on which hate speech 
bans are often defended. Consider Bhikhu Parekh’s observation that “[w]hen hate 
speech is allowed uninhibited expression, its targets rightly conclude that the state 
either shares the implied sentiments or does not consider their dignity, self- respect, 
and well- being important enough to warrant action” (2012, 44). If  this claim is 
persuasive, then state policies that protect some targets of  hateful speech but not 
others are likely to signal that the state considers some people’s dignity, self- respect, 
and well- being more important than others’.
To sum up the argument so far, the hate speech debates have proceeded on 
both consequentialist and deontological grounds. That is, opponents and propo-
nents of  hate speech regulation have offered competing accounts of  the effects 
of  democratic societies’ decisions to enact and enforce such regulations (or their 
decisions not to do so), and they have also offered competing accounts of  the fun-
damental democratic and/or dignitarian legitimacy of  those decisions. With some 
frequency, the debate has proceeded on what may best be understood as hybrid 
consequentialist/deontological grounds, with proponents arguing that hate speech 
bans signal to members of  vulnerable groups their equal status in democratic so-
cieties. Note, for example, Julie Suk’s observation that the purpose of  the French 
Holocaust denial law is not to suppress expression of  Holocaust denial—which can 
be freely found in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France—but to express the state’s 
disapproval of  these ideas (2012, 153; see also Parekh 2012). This claim is conse-
quentialist in form—legislative bans on hate speech will have the salutary effect of  
communicating a message of  inclusion to vulnerable members of  society—but is 
usually best understood as deontological at its root—because the value and effec-
tiveness of  this communication are typically assumed rather than demonstrated. 
In this paper, I argue that the hybrid case in favor of  hate speech bans ought to 
be balanced against a parallel hybrid claim in opposition—namely, that legislative 
bans on hate speech communicate a message of  exclusion to members of  vulnera-
ble groups who are left outside the scope of  the bans’ protection.
HATE SPEECH AND DOUBLE STANDARDS
The unequal coverage provided by existing hate speech regulations is poten-
tially redressible in either of  two ways. One option is an across-the-board, First- 
Amendment-style legal tolerance for public expressions of  hatred. The second is a 
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continual incremental expansion of  the scope of  hate speech laws. If  restrictions on 
hateful speech are understood as a form of  antidiscrimination law, then all targets 
of  such speech—like all victims of  other forms of  discrimination—will be incen-
tivized to seek the protection of  such laws. And if  we fail to extend such protection 
to groups with legitimate claims, we send a signal of  unequal citizenship to the 
members of  those groups. Misogynist speech, for example, can be just as vile and 
denigrating as other forms of  hate speech, and its exclusion from most existing hate 
speech laws has prompted recent calls for reform (Citron 2014). As a result of  such 
dynamics, hate speech laws (like other antidiscrimination laws) are likely to be the 
focus of  repeated calls for expansion over time.
Of  course, countervailing calls from libertarians and others may create signifi-
cant uncertainty as to whether, when, and how such expansion will actually unfold, 
but in post-war Western Europe, the political demands of  vulnerable minorities 
have repeatedly led to incremental expansion, with hate speech laws drawn initially 
to protect racial minorities and subsequently expanded to protect other groups. 
Legislative restrictions on anti- Semitic speech (including Holocaust denial) are now 
widespread, and European lawmakers face regular calls to restrict Islamophobic 
and homophobic speech as well (Belavusau 2013, 166–200; Bleich 2011; Haraszti 
2012; Kahn 2004; Langer 2014; Leigh 2009).
As such, I argue that democratic societies should be prepared to tolerate racist 
and anti- Semitic speech, unless they are willing to extend their intolerance to cover 
speech that incites hatred against Muslims and gays. I rest this claim not primarily 
on grounds of  principled consistency, but on a pragmatic concern for how best to 
integrate diverse groups of  citizens into contemporary democratic polities. Wal-
dron himself  emphasizes this concern throughout his Holmes Lectures, but he does 
not acknowledge one of  its clear implications. If  one key goal of  hate speech policy 
is to better integrate vulnerable minorities into the democratic societies in which 
they live—by signaling to them that they are indeed welcome as full and equal 
members—then it must be the members of  these vulnerable groups who decide 
which speech acts are the objectionable ones. If  those decisions are made solely by 
European legislators and judges, and if  those lawmakers fail adequately to attend 
to the understandings of  the targets of  hateful speech, then the signal will not work. 
Of  course, European Muslims are as internally diverse as any other sizeable social 
group, so there is no “Muslim position” on free expression or any other complex 
policy or legal issue (K. Malik 2009, 121–3). But when democratic states ban racist 
and anti- Semitic speech, they send an important signal to racial minorities and 
Jews that their presence in these polities is valued and will be protected. And if  
they repeatedly refuse demands from their Muslim and LGBT members to expand 
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the scope of  these bans to cover published caricatures of  the Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH) and religious denunciations of  homosexuality as sinful, they will repeatedly 
signal that these groups are not full and equal members. On the other hand, if  these 
polities respond to such demands by expanding their existing laws, these expansions 
would curb the liberty of  religious expression—for both secular critics of  Islam 
and Christian critics of  homosexuality—to a degree that most democratic polities 
would (or should) find intolerable. As Heinze has put it, “[h]ate speech bans can 
only succeed either through enormous measures of  censorship or through discrim-
inatory selection of  target categories or individuals” (2009, 279).
Waldron sometimes references homophobic and Islamophobic speech together 
with racist speech as proper subjects of  regulation (2012, 65), but he devotes very 
little attention to homophobic speech and he generally tries to draw a sharp line 
between racist hate speech and religious dissent. On his account, the publication of  
racist epithets should be banned; the publication of  blasphemous images should be 
tolerated (2012, 111–26). Waldron does not say on which side of  this line he would 
place anti- gay readings from scripture, but he does indicate that legislators should 
be “vigilant” in ensuring that regulation of  racist assaults on dignity does not lead 
to regulation of  all speech that leads an identifiable group of  citizens to take offense 
(2012, 114). He insists that this line is fundamentally clear, but some readers of  his 
account remain unpersuaded. Brian Leiter (2012) notes that Waldron’s own rhe-
torical asides repeatedly illustrate that the harm in hate speech does in fact include 
psychological/emotional offense on the part of  its targets. And Heinze observes 
that European judges have sometimes drawn the line differently than Waldron, as 
when the European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR) interpreted the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) “as protecting ‘the religious feelings of  be-
lievers’ from ‘provocative portrayals of  objects of  religious veneration.’ ”6
The legal distinction between harm and offense is a longstanding one—indeed, 
it marks the core of  Anglo- American libel law—but its social meaning when trans-
lated from the individual to the group libel context—i.e., when enacted into legisla-
tive bans on hate speech—is to signal that some harms to some groups are worthy 
of  legal redress, while others are not. This sort of  legal distinction is routine, but in 
this context, it tends to signal (or at least to be read as signaling) that some vulner-
able groups are treated more favorably than others. For many European Muslims, 
the chief  examples of  public speech acts that they experience as harms are images 
(and especially offensive caricatures) of  the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH); for many 
6. Heinze (2006, 558), quoting Otto- Preminger-Institut v. Austria, Application no. 13470/87 (ECtHR 
1994). 
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European gays, the chief  examples are anti- gay readings of  Leviticus. From their 
perspective, if  we are in the business of  banning hateful speech, then these examples 
are prime candidates. But restrictions on this sort of  anti- Muslim and anti- gay speech 
would inevitably trench on serious commentary on matters of  public concern.
Again, with regard to the scope of  legal protection for free speech, the double- 
standard complaint could be addressed by either leveling up or leveling down. In 
contemporary Europe, national legislatures could choose to extend the same sort of  
bans to Islamophobic and homophobic speech that they have extended to racist and 
anti- Semitic speech or they could choose to relax their existing bans on racist and 
anti- Semitic speech. This latter course is politically unlikely, but it remains theoret-
ically available. Likewise, the ECtHR could, in theory, try to nudge member states 
in either direction. In other words, ECtHR judges could find in ECHR Article 10’s 
free expression provision a mandate that states provide greater freedom to express 
hateful ideas than they currently do.7 Or they could rely on Article 14’s antidiscrim-
ination provision and/or Article 17’s prohibition on abuse of  rights to mandate that 
states extend their existing regulations of  some hateful speech acts to cover addi-
tional such acts directed against similarly vulnerable groups.8 The ECtHR’s rights 
jurisprudence is tempered by a “margin of  appreciation” for the legal norms of  
member states, but if  something approaching continent- wide consensus began to 
emerge (in either direction), the Court could use its quasi- constitutional role to push 
holdout states to fall into line. In other words, it could seek to ensure that racist and 
anti- Semitic speech acts are suppressed no more than other, equally harmful speech 
acts targeting European Muslims and gays, either by cutting back on existing bans 
7. Article 10 expressly provides that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of  expression,” though it also 
notes a number of  public purposes that sometimes justify restrictions on that freedom, including “the 
protection of  the reputation or rights of  others.” 
8. Article 14 provides that “[t]he enjoyment of  the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status.” Article 17 provides that “[n]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as 
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed 
at the destruction of  any of  the rights and freedoms set forth herein.” See Aksu v. Turkey, Applica-
tion nos. 4149/04 41029/04 (ECtHR 2012) (dissenting opinion of  Judge Gyulumyan); Glimmerveen 
and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands, Application nos. 8348/78 and 8406/78 (Commission decision of  
11 October 1979); Norwood v. UK, Application no. 23131/03 (ECtHR 2004); Garaudy v. France, 
Application no. 65831/01 (ECtHR 2003); Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, Application no. 
26261/05 (ECtHR 2013); and Perinçek v. Switzerland, Application no. 27510/08 (ECtHR 2015) (dis-
senting opinion of  Judge Silvis).
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on racist and anti- Semitic speech or by developing new bans on Islamophobic and 
homophobic speech, depending which way the consensus had developed.
To date, what has actually emerged in practice is a complex and inconsistent 
pattern of  both legislative restrictions and judicial evaluations of  those restric-
tions—a pattern that cannot readily be defended and that may leave some vulner-
able members of  European societies feeling aggrieved. For example, a number of  
states have banned Holocaust denial, and European judges have sustained these 
bans. In Garaudy v. France (2003), the ECtHR held that
Denying the reality of  clearly established historical facts .  .  . does not constitute 
historical research akin to a quest for the truth. The aim and the result of  that 
approach are completely different, the real purpose being to rehabilitate the Na-
tional–Socialist regime and, as a consequence, accuse the victims themselves of  
falsifying history. Denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of  the most se-
rious forms of  racial defamation of  Jews and of  incitement to hatred of  them. . . . 
Such acts are incompatible with democracy and human rights because they in-
fringe the rights of  others.9
But when some states have extended such bans to cover denials of  other crimes 
against humanity—most notably, the Ottoman Empire’s 1915 genocidal campaign 
against Armenians—European judges have invalidated such broader bans. In Per-
inçek v. Switzerland (2015), a Grand Chamber of  the ECtHR noted that “many of  
the descendants of  the victims of  the events of  1915 and the following years—
especially those in the Armenian diaspora—construct [their] identity around the 
perception that their community has been the victim of  genocide.” The Grand 
Chamber noted further that the Swiss prosecution of  Doğu Perinçek for publicly 
denying those genocidal events was intended to protect the “dignity” of  the Arme-
nian victims of  1915 and their present- day descendants, but the Court nonetheless 
held that the Swiss criminal ban on Armenian genocide denial was not “necessary 
in a democratic society” and hence was invalid under ECHR Article 10.10 In sup-
9. Garaudy v. France, Application no. 65831/01 (ECtHR 2003). See also Witzsch v. Germany (no. 1), 
Application no. 41448/98 (ECtHR 1999); Schimanek v. Austria, Application no. 32307/96 (ECtHR 
2000); Witzsch v. Germany (no. 2), Application no. 7485/03 (ECtHR 2005); Gollnisch v. France, Ap-
plication no. 48135/08 (ECtHR 2011); Holocaust Denial Case, (1994) 90 BVerfGE 241. See generally 
Bleich (2011, 44–61); Kahn (2004). 
10. Perinçek v. Switzerland, Application no. 27510/08 (ECtHR 2015), para. 156. Note also Decision 
no. 2012647 DC (French Constitutional Council 2012). 
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port of  this judgment, the Court indicated that Perinçek’s statements, “read as a 
whole and taken in their immediate and wider context, cannot be seen as a call for 
hatred, violence or intolerance towards the Armenians,” though it acknowledged 
that in cases involving Holocaust denial, such incitement has “invariably been pre-
sumed.”11 The Court’s principal justification for this differential treatment was that 
historical memory laws are more readily defensible when enacted by states that 
have a close historical and geographic nexus with the genocidal crimes at issue. 
This nexus is present with regard to German or French laws governing Holocaust 
denial; it is absent with regard to the Swiss law governing Armenian genocide 
denial.12
The Perinçek case illustrates the difficult choice facing European judges in such 
disputes, which explains why the Grand Chamber was closely divided, resolving the 
case by a vote of  10–7. The seven dissenting judges argued that because ECtHR 
jurisprudence allows the criminalization of  Holocaust denial, it is difficult to jus-
tify forbidding the criminalization of  Armenian genocide denial. But the ten-judge 
majority argued that allowing criminalization in the latter context would unduly 
limit discussion of  important matters of  public concern. Both of  these claims are 
persuasive.
Similar dilemmas have played out in the context of  Islamophobic and ho-
mophobic speech, which are the focus of  the remainder of  this article. A steadily 
increasing number of  European states have banned homophobic speech, and 
the ECtHR has so far allowed enforcement of  these bans in ways that—at least 
from a U.S. First Amendment perspective—trench on clear free expression val-
ues. In other words, for European LGBT persons, current legal trends signal a 
message of  inclusion, but these acts of  inclusion have come at the cost of  severe 
restrictions on the religious expression of  Christian (and Muslim) opponents of  
homosexuality. Meanwhile, most European states have banned some forms of  
Islamophobic speech, but not the ones to which European Muslims themselves 
most object. The failure of  these bans to cover published caricatures of  the 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) has been a chief  source of  the double- standard 
complaint, an effect that has been exacerbated by the ECtHR’s broad toler-
ance of  enforcement of  other speech- restricting laws against European Muslims 
themselves. As a result, for European Muslims, existing law sends a clear signal 
of  unequal citizenship.
11. Perinçek v. Switzerland, Application no. 27510/08 (ECtHR 2015), para. 234, 239.
12. For a critique of  such nexus arguments, see Kahn (2014). 
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ISLAMOPHOBIC (AND ISLAMIST) SPEECH
For at least the past decade, Islamophobic speech has occupied the epicenter of  
global free speech conflict. Following the September 2005 publication of  the infa-
mous cartoons caricaturing the Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) by the Danish news-
paper Jyllands- Posten, a variety of  Muslim organizations in Europe and around the 
world accelerated their preexisting efforts to appeal to both national legal institu-
tions and international human rights bodies to regulate speech that blasphemes or 
defames the Islamic faith (Kahn 2011; Klausen 2009; Langer 2014). While some 
of  this outrage was drummed up by leaders of  Muslim states seeking to needle 
Western governments and/or stoke their own popularity at home (Klausen 2009), 
it is clear that Muslim objections to Western depictions of  the Prophet (PBUH) are 
sincere, deeply rooted, and long felt, with the first such controversy dating to 1925 
(Langer 2014).
Some European states regularly prosecute Islamaphobic speech acts. The most 
well-known examples include the repeated French prosecutions of  Brigitte Bardot 
and Marine Le Pen for harsh criticisms of  Muslim religious practices; the Dutch 
prosecution of  Geert Wilders, a sitting member of  Parliament, for repeated pub-
lic denunciations of  Islam; and the English prosecution of  Mark Anthony Nor-
wood for displaying a small sign in the window of  his flat declaring “Islam out of  
Britain—Protect the British people” (Bleich 2011, 29–36; Brettschneider 2012, 2; 
Nossiter 2015; Weinstein 2009, 44–52).13 Norwood was convicted of  a “racially 
or religiously aggravated” violation of  the Public Order Act, which prohibits the 
display of  “any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, 
abusive or insulting, within the hearing or sight of  a person likely to be caused 
harassment, alarm or distress thereby.”14 At the time, England had no explicit ban 
on religious hate speech, but in 2006, Parliament prohibited the use of  threatening 
words, behavior, or display of  written material intended to stir up religious hatred. 
On Erik Bleich’s account, this legislative change was motivated in part by the fact 
that English courts were using the 1965 Race Relations Act to protect Jews and 
13. Note also Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 2004.734 H, 158/2003 (Denmark S. Ct. 2004); Soulas and 
 Others v. France, Application no. 15948/03 (ECtHR 2008); Féret v. Belgium, Application no. 
15615/07 (ECtHR 2009).
14. Public Order Act 1986, 1986 Chapter 64, sec. 5(1)(b), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
1986/64. As provided by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, “racially or religiously aggravated” in-
stances of  this offense are subject to increased sentences. Norwood appealed his conviction to the 
ECtHR, which found his application inadmissible in Norwood v. United Kingdom, Application no. 
23131/03 (ECtHR 2004).
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Sikhs—religious minorities defined at least partly on ethnic/racial lines—but not 
to protect other religious groups. This double standard was particularly acute in 
the case of  British Muslims, because post-9/11 anti- terrorism legislation had led 
to increased policing of  Islamist expression by Muslims themselves (Bleich 2011, 
23–29; see also Ahdar and Leigh 2005, 379–80).
Despite legislative changes like the 2006 Racial and Religious Hatred Act in 
Britain, the years following publication of  the Danish cartoons in 2005 witnessed 
virtually no success for Muslim appeals to national and international legal insti-
tutions to restrict the publication of  caricatures of  the Prophet (PBUH). Muslim 
governments and NGOs repeatedly sought to persuade Western states to include 
Islam within the protections of  their existing blasphemy or hate speech laws or to 
create a new legal concept of  religious insult or defamation of  religion. But Danish 
prosecutors declined to indict the editors or cartoonists at Jyllands- Posten for blas-
phemy or hate speech, and the Danish courts then rejected a private defamation 
complaint (Langer 2014, 64–73). When the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo 
reprinted all of  the cartoons in February 2006 (also adding a number of  new ones 
of  its own), the French courts likewise held that relevant provisions of  defamation 
and hate speech law had not been violated (Langer 2014, 73–77). Similar disputes 
played out elsewhere, but on Lorenz Langer’s comprehensive account, “[i]n no 
Western jurisdiction did courts or legal proceedings bring the redress sought by 
Muslim applicants” (2014, 83). Indeed, a debate that had begun in various national 
legislatures and international human rights bodies several years before publication 
of  the Danish cartoons culminated in October 2008 with a recommendation from 
the Venice Commission that the crime of  blasphemy should be abolished and that 
“it is neither necessary nor desirable to create an offence of  religious insult (that is, 
insult to religious feelings) simpliciter, without the element of  incitement to hatred 
as an essential component” (McGonagle 2012, 496; see also Appiah 2012; Klausen 
2009, 53–79; Langer 2014). As a result, and to paint with a broad brush, the ex-
isting state of  European law is that public expressions of  religious hatred are often 
prohibited under the same or similar statutes as public expressions of  racial hatred, 
but publications like Jyllands- Posten and Charlie Hebdo remain free to caricature and 
satirize religious icons and doctrines of  all faiths.
Whether or not this distinction is defensible on theoretical grounds, its enact-
ment in law has the effect of  signaling to many European Muslims that the speech 
acts which they find most hateful and offensive are permissible, and hence that their 
deeply held interests and identities are less worthy of  protection than others’. This 
signal of  unfairness is exacerbated by the fact that European Muslims have them-
selves run afoul of  racial and religious hatred laws (when their speech acts are read 
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as inciting hatred against adherents of  other religions), bans on homophobic speech 
(when they join conservative Christians in preaching that homosexuality is sinful) 
and anti- terrorism laws (when their speech acts are read as glorifying terrorism) (Ah-
dar and Leigh 2005, 381; Greenwald 2015a, 2015b; Leigh 2007, 252–6, 2009, 382).
Indeed, following the January 2015 terrorist attack on the offices of  Charlie 
Hebdo and a Kosher grocery store in Paris, the French celebration of  the magazine’s 
right to mock the powerful and powerless alike was juxtaposed—strangely, at least 
from a U.S. First Amendment perspective—with aggressive policing by French au-
thorities of  other forms of  expression. In the very moment when so much of  France 
was declaring “Je suis Charlie,” comedian Dieudonné M’bala M’bala was convicted 
for writing on Facebook, “Je me sens Charlie Coulibaly.” Playing on the widespread 
use of  “Je suis Charlie” as a statement of  solidarity with the victims, Dieudonné 
(as he is widely known in France) was referring to one of  the perpetrators of  the 
January 2015 terrorist attacks, Amedy Coulibaly. Dieudonné was convicted under 
a November 2014 anti- terrorism law that authorized sentences of  up to seven years 
in prison and fines of  up to 100,000 euros, but he was given a suspended sentence 
of  two months (Breeden 2015). Within weeks of  the attacks, French courts had 
meted out criminal sentences in scores of  additional such cases under the Novem-
ber 2014 law, including sentences of  six months for a French- Tunisian man who 
shouted support for the attackers as he drove past a police station—“They killed 
Charlie and I had a good laugh. In the past they killed Bin Laden, Saddam Hus-
sein, Mohammed Merah and many brothers. If  I didn’t have a father or mother, I 
would train in Syria.”—and four years for a man who praised the attackers while 
being arrested for driving under the influence of  alcohol (Carvajal and Cowell-
jan 2015; Chrisafis 2015). Dieudonné’s crime was “apology of  terrorism,” but as 
Chrisje Brants and Eric Heinze have argued, “bans on glorifying terrorism [have 
increasingly] become akin to conventional hate speech bans, insofar as such bans 
would penalize even those utterances that are not made pursuant to any specific 
terrorist act, but purely because they express views that are deemed . . . to be dan-
gerous, intolerant or provocative” (Heinze 2007, 295; see also Brants 2007).
Such speech- related prosecutions of  French Islamists predated both the Charlie 
Hebdo attacks and the 2014 anti- terrorism law. Dieudonné himself  has been charged 
at least 38 times with violating French bans on inciting racial hatred, denying the Ho-
locaust, and threatening public order (Edinger 2008; Rubin 2014; Stille 2014, 2015; 
Waintrater 2005). In 2001, French cartoonist Denis Leroy was convicted of  complic-
ity in condoning terrorism for publishing, two days after the 9/11 attacks, a render-
ing of  the planes hitting the World Trade Center in New York City, with a caption 
appearing to praise the attackers: “WE HAVE ALL DREAMT OF IT . . . HAMAS 
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DID IT.” (The caption was a parody of  a well-known advertising slogan in France: 
“You have dreamt of  it . . . Sony did it.”) Muslim expression is further curtailed by 
the French prohibition on wearing head scarves in schools (which dates to 2004) 
and wearing burqas anywhere in public (which dates to 2011). The ECtHR upheld 
Leroy’s conviction and has repeatedly upheld the French bans on religious dress.15
This conflict has played out elsewhere in Europe as well. No cartoonists or 
newspaper editors faced legal penalties for publishing caricatures of  the Prophet 
(PBUH), but four British Muslims who protested against the cartoons outside the 
Danish Embassy in London were convicted and sentenced to four to six years in 
prison for inciting violence and/or racial hatred (Bleich 2011, 39; Evans 2007; 
Langer 2014, 81).
Surely the signal sent by these legal responses is that members of  European 
society have the freedom to mock Islam but not to advocate radical Islamism (or to 
wear a burqa). Likewise, that Europeans have the freedom to mock Islam but not to 
mock minorities on the basis of  race. This complaint about a double standard has 
been regularly voiced by European Muslims; indeed, on Jytte Klausen’s account, 
it was “a constant refrain in the cartoon controversy.” The lesson drawn from the 
conflict by many European Muslims was that “the Danish state and the newspaper 
did not extend the same protection against prejudice and defamation to Muslims 
as to Christians. It was not an antiliberal argument but an argument about the 
entitlements Muslims have in liberal democracies” (2009, 88, 130, see also 61–62).
The double- standard argument has received attention from a variety of  West-
ern commentators (Garton Ash 2006; Greenwald 2015b, 2015c; K. Malik 2015; 
Saletan 2012; Stille 2014, 2015), but with the notable exception of  Eric Heinze’s 
work, it has not been integrated into the scholarly literature on the legitimacy of  
hate speech bans. Waldron’s response, often echoed by European lawyers, is to 
distinguish between incitements to hatred of  racial and religious groups (which 
should be prohibited) and criticism of  religious beliefs and practices (which should 
be allowed) (Waldron 2012; see also Carvajal and Cowelljan 2015; Kahn 2011; 
Stille 2015). Waldron explicitly endorses the non- prosecution of  Jyllands- Posten for 
the cartoon depictions of  Muhammed (PBUH), and he insists that the “distinction 
between an attack on a body of  beliefs and an attack on the basic social standing 
15. Leroy v. France, Application no. 36109/03 (ECtHR 2008); Dogru v. France, Application no. 
27058/05 (ECtHR 2008); Kervanci v. France, Application no. 31645/04 (ECtHR 2008); S.A.S. v. 
France, Application no. 43835/11 (ECtHR 2014). But see Gūndūz v. Turkey, Application no. 35071/97 
(ECtHR 2003), in which the ECtHR found a violation of  Article 10 in a case involving criminal pros-
ecution of  Islamist speech.
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and reputation of  a group of  people is clear” (2012, 114–126). The distinction 
may be clear to Waldron, but many European Muslims seem unpersuaded by it. 
Its unpersuasive character is exacerbated by European laws prohibiting Holocaust 
denial, which are widespread and vigorously enforced, and which seem closer to 
hypothetical laws banning depictions of  the Prophet (PBUH) than to actual laws 
banning racist hate speech (Bleich 2011, 44–61). As Bleich notes, this juxtaposition 
was particularly stark in February 2006 when, at the height of  the Danish cartoon 
controversy, an Austrian court convicted David Irving of  Holocaust denial and 
sentenced him to three years in prison (2011, 56–57). Banning Holocaust denial 
might make sense because such speech acts are deeply hurtful to many Jews and 
indeed are a leading mode for contemporary expressions of  anti- Semitism (Kahn 
2004; Suk 2012). But then why would we not also ban caricatures of  the Prophet 
(PBUH), which are deeply hurtful to many Muslims and indeed are a leading mode 
for contemporary expressions of  Islamophobia?
In sum, Waldron’s distinction between written epithets directed against racial 
and religious minorities (which should be banned) and written mockery of  minority 
religious doctrines (which should be allowed) is reasonable in the abstract, but its 
social meaning when enacted into law by contemporary European states is to signal 
to vulnerable Muslim minorities that they are not equal citizens of  those societies. 
One widespread Muslim response to these signals is to demand legal regulation 
of  written mockery of  their faith. European governments have generally been un-
willing to accede to such demands, for the good reason that free and democratic 
societies require space to criticize religious doctrine. But this decision has resulted 
in a legal playing field that does not appear to be level, and European judges to 
date have proven unwilling or unable to level it. In addition to rejecting freedom-of- 
expression and freedom-of- religion challenges to French bans on Muslim clothing 
and other forms of  Islamist expression (such as the Leroy cartoon), the ECtHR 
also rejected a Moroccan complaint about the Danish non- prosecution of  Jyllands- 
Posten, though we do not know what it would have done if  Danish Muslims had 
brought such a complaint.16 But this same court has repeatedly upheld legislative 
bans on racist hate speech, legislative bans on Holocaust denial, and in one sub-
stantive ruling to date, a legislative ban on anti- gay speech.17
16. The ECtHR held that the Moroccans’ application was inadmissible because “there is no jurisdic-
tional link between any of  the applicants and the relevant member State, namely Denmark.” Ben el 
Mahi v. Denmark, Application no. 5853/06 (ECtHR 2006).
17. In addition to the cases cited in note 9, see Balsytė- Lideikienė v. Lithuania, Application no. 
72596/01 (ECtHR 2008); Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, Application no. 35222/04 (ECtHR 2007); Hizb 
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HOMOPHOBIC SPEECH
Like European Muslims, European LGBT communities have argued that the 
state’s failure to protect them against hateful and abusive speech signals that their 
rights and security are less valuable than those of  other minority communities. As a 
result, some LGBT rights advocates have called for legislative bans on such speech 
acts, some European states have heeded these calls, and some courts have allowed 
such bans to be enforced; these efforts almost inevitably trench on well- established 
spheres of  protected religious and political speech.
For example, the Swedish parliament amended its hate speech law in 2003 to 
include sexual orientation. As amended, the Act prohibited any statement or com-
munication that “threatens or expresses contempt for an ethnic group or any other 
group of  people with reference to their race, skin colour, nationality or ethnic origin, 
religious belief  or sexual orientation.”18 It authorized prison sentences of  two years 
for violations, or longer if  the speech act was especially threatening, extremely disre-
spectful, or widely disseminated. Despite requests from the Swedish Council of  Free 
Churches, the statute did not exempt sermons, and the Swedish Minister of  Justice 
indicated that some anti- gay sermons might well be prohibited (Bob 2014, 216). At 
the time of  enactment, the Government issued a statement indicating that “the pur-
pose of  this legislative solution is [to] underscore that the same principles are to be 
used in considering whether an act against homosexuals, for example, is within the 
purview of  the provisions regarding incitement against a group, as when consider-
ing an act against any of  the other groups that are protected by these provisions.”19
This legislative change was supported by (some) LGBT rights advocates, both 
in Sweden and internationally. Key actors included the Stockholm- based Swedish 
Federation for Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Rights and the Interna-
tional Lesbian and Gay Association (Bob 2014). As Ian Leigh has noted, LGBT 
organizations had “lobbied for an offence of  this kind as an equalizing measure 
that would bring the treatment of  sexual- orientation equality into line with race 
and religious equality” (2009, 384). Heeding such concerns, the European Parlia-
ment has passed repeated resolutions demanding an end to homophobic speech, 
and a number of  national legislatures have followed suit (Bob 2014, 224). In 2008, 
utTahrir and Others v. Germany, Application no. 31098/08 (ECtHR 2012); Kasymakhunov and Say-
batalov v. Russia, Application nos. 26261/05 and 26377/06 (ECtHR 2013); and Vejdeland and Others 
v. Sweden, Application no. 1813/07 (ECtHR 2012). 
18. Swedish Penal Code, Ch. 16, sec. 8, quoted in Prosecutor General v. Green, Case No. B 105005 
(Supreme Court of  Sweden 2005). 
19. Quoted in Prosecutor General v. Green, Case No. B 105005 (Supreme Court of  Sweden 2005).
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England amended its law of  incitement to provide that it would be illegal to use 
threatening words, behavior, or written material with intent to stir up hatred on the 
grounds of  sexual orientation. In response to religious critics, the new provision 
was altered prior to enactment to provide that “the discussion or criticism of  sexual 
conduct or practices or the urging of  persons to refrain from or modify such con-
duct or practices shall not be taken of  itself  to be threatening or intended to stir up 
hatred.”20 Statutory bans on anti-gay speech have been enacted in Croatia, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, 
and Norway as well.21
Even before these legislative changes, anti-gay speakers were sometimes pros-
ecuted under existing laws that did not reference sexual orientation directly. In 
2001, for example, Harry Hammond was convicted under England’s Public Order 
Act for holding a sign in a town square with the message “Stop Immorality. Stop 
Homosexuality. Stop Lesbianism. Jesus is Lord.” In the U.S., such messages are a 
routine feature of  sidewalk preaching in many college towns (and elsewhere), but 
in England, Hammond ran afoul of  the Act’s ban on the display of  “any writing, 
sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, within 
the hearing or sight of  a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress 
thereby.”22 The English High Court held that Hammond’s freedom of  expression 
was outweighed by the need to defend public order and protect the rights of  gays 
and lesbians. Hammond died while his appeal was pending, and though his heirs 
sought to continue the case, the ECtHR ultimately declared it inadmissible on the 
grounds of  his death.23
Following the legislative change in Sweden, Pentecostal pastor Åke Green 
intentionally provoked a legal test of  the new law by delivering a sermon enti-
tled “Is homosexuality congenital or the powers of  evil meddling with people?” 
During the course of  the sermon, Green drew on scriptural readings of  Leviticus 
20. Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, ch. 4, schedule 16; see Leigh (2009).
21. Croatian Penal Code, S174; Danish Penal Code, §266b; Finnish Criminal Code, ch. 11, sec. 10; 
French Penal Code, Article R.624 and 625; French Press Law of  1881, Article 24 (as amended 1972); 
Greek Law 4285/2014, Article 1; Icelandic General Penal Code No. 19, Article 233a; Irish Prohibition 
of  Incitement to Hatred Act 1989; Lithuanian Criminal Code, Article 170, No. VIII-1968; Dutch Pe-
nal Code, sec. 137c and d; Norwegian General Civil Penal Code, §135a. See Bangstad (2014); Bleich 
(2011: 40–41); Langer (2014); Leigh (2007, 2009); Loof  (2007); Saletan (2012); Mattijssen and Smith 
(1996).
22. Public Order Act 1986, 1986 Chapter 64, sec. 5(1)(b), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
1986/64. See Weinstein (2009: 30–35).
23. Fairfield and Others v. UK, Application no. 24790/04 (ECtHR 2005). 
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and Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians in preaching that legal recognition of  
same-sex relationships would “create unparalleled catastrophes,” that “sexual ab-
normalities are a serious cancerous growth on the body of  a society,” and that 
“sexually perverse people will even force themselves upon animals.”24 As with the 
legislative change that enabled it, Green’s prosecution was supported by (some) 
LGBT rights advocates, both in Sweden and internationally (Bob 2014). Green 
was convicted and sentenced to one month in prison. On appeal, the Swedish 
Supreme Court rejected his domestic constitutional speech and religious freedom 
arguments, but reversed the conviction on the grounds that it was inconsistent 
with ECHR Article 10.25 This latter holding was a victory for free expression, but 
it left the statute in place for future prosecutions, with the Swedish Court appear-
ing to indicate that some potential applications of  the law remained legitimate.26 
In other words, in the absence of  continental free speech norms, the Court would 
have upheld Green’s conviction under Swedish law, despite its clear and sweep-
ing infringement on religious speech; even with those norms in place, the Court 
signaled that it might uphold future such convictions where the infringement on 
speech was less severe.
The ECtHR itself  did not weigh in on the merits of  a homophobic speech case 
until 2012. In Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden (2012), the European Court rejected an 
Article 10 claim filed by a group of  Swedes who had distributed anti-gay leaflets 
to students in an upper secondary school. The leaflets, produced by an organiza-
tion called National Youth, characterized homosexuality as “deviant” and “mor-
ally destructive,” urged students to tell their teachers that the AIDS epidemic was 
rooted in homosexuals’ “promiscuous lifestyle,” and suggested that homosexual 
lobby organizations were seeking to legalize pedophilia.27 The avowed purpose of  
the leafletting was to initiate a debate regarding what the speech claimants saw as 
biased curricular content in the Swedish schools. The leaftletters were convicted in 
Swedish courts of  violating the national hate speech law, as amended in 2003, and 
two of  them were initially sentenced to two months in jail. In July 2006, a divided 
Supreme Court upheld the convictions, but suspended the prison sentences. Four 
of  those convicted then petitioned to the European Court on Article 10 grounds.
24. Prosecutor General v. Green, Case No. B 105005 (Supreme Court of  Sweden 2005).
25. Prosecutor General v. Green, Case No. B 105005 (Supreme Court of  Sweden 2005).
26. Prosecutor General v. Green, Case No. B 105005 (Supreme Court of  Sweden 2005). See Bob 
(2014).
27. Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, Application no. 1813/07 (ECtHR 2012), para. 8. 
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At the ECtHR, the International Centre for the Legal Protection of  Human 
Rights and the International Commission of  Jurists argued (as third- party interve-
nors) that
Sexual orientation should be treated in the same way as categories such as race, 
ethnicity and religion which are commonly covered by hate-speech and hate-crime 
laws, because sexual orientation is a characteristic that is fundamental to a person’s 
sense of  self. . . . When a particular group is singled out for victimisation and dis-
crimination, hate-speech laws should protect those characteristics that are essential 
to a person’s identity and that are used as evidence of  belonging to a particular 
group. Restrictions on freedom of  expression must therefore be permissible in in-
stances where the aim of  the speech is to degrade, insult or incite hatred against 
persons or a class of  person on account of  their sexual orientation, so long as such 
restrictions are in accordance with the Court’s well- established principles.28
Noting that “discrimination based on sexual orientation is as serious as discrimina-
tion based on ‘race, origin or colour’,” the Court agreed.29
These arguments are understandable from the perspective of  LGBT rights 
advocates seeking the same sort of  legal protections that other vulnerable minority 
groups have won, but the ECtHR’s holding opens the door to potentially significant 
infringements on Article 10 free speech rights. Given the limited doctrine to date, 
we do not yet know how far the ECtHR will allow such infringements to go. If  the 
European judges had heard the Green case, for example, would they have reached 
the same judgment as the Swedish Supreme Court? In other words, are the differ-
ent results in Green and Vejdeland the result of  a national court adopting a broader 
reading of  Article 10 than the European Court requires? Or a result of  the cases’ 
different fact patterns? In short, when the ECtHR faces a case like Green’s—in-
volving criminal prosecution for anti-gay readings of  the Bible, delivered from the 
pulpit—will it find an Article 10 violation?
CONCLUSION
The European legal treatment of  Islamophobic and homophobic speech illustrates 
the two horns of  the dilemma faced by democratic states seeking to outlaw hateful 
28. Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, Application no. 1813/07 (ECtHR 2012), para. 45–46.
29. Vejdeland and Others v. Sweden, Application no. 1813/07 (ECtHR 2012), para. 55.
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speech. With regard to satirical and offensive caricatures of  the Prophet Moham-
med (PBUH), Western European states have by and large erred on the side of  de-
fending free expression, at the cost of  signaling to a vulnerable minority that they 
must tolerate what they see as hateful, discriminatory, and harmful speech acts. 
With regard to religiously motivated denunciations of  homosexuality, European 
states have increasingly erred on the side of  protecting vulnerable minorities from 
harmful speech, at the cost of  signaling to religious conservatives that their deeply 
held views are not welcome in public debate.
From a U.S. First Amendment perspective, the European approach to speech 
involving Islam in particular seems to represent a worst-of-both-worlds stance. On 
the one hand, in an extension of  their approach to racist hate speech, European 
legislators and judges have gone so far in banning both anti- Muslim and pro- 
terrorism speech that they have trenched on what seem like clear and fundamental 
democratic norms of  free expression: note, for example, the convictions of  Mark 
Norwood and Denis Leroy. On the other hand, the pervasive speech acts about 
which actual European Muslims express the greatest concern—mocking images 
of  the Prophet (PBUH)—are tolerated as legitimate commentary on religious doc-
trine, with European lawmakers lecturing Muslims on the sorts of  tolerance that 
are required in a diverse democratic society.
This dilemma has no easy solution. As Bleich has noted with regard to the 
Danish cartoons, “[t]he failed lawsuits in Denmark and France indicate to [Mus-
lim] plaintiffs that their feelings are not given sufficient weight by the state. Yet if  
Muslim groups had won these cases, the ability to express controversial ideas in the 
public sphere would have been severely compromised” (2011, 40). If  European 
legislatures and courts are unwilling—for good reason—to start banning published 
caricatures of  Mohammed (PBUH), then their best bet may be to stop banning Is-
lamist calls for violent resistance to the West—i.e., to stop banning such calls unless 
and until they rise to the level of  true threats to individuals or otherwise incite one 
or more persons to engage in imminent violent action. (On speech acts that virtu-
ally everyone, including civil libertarians, believes can legitimately be regulated, 
see Heinze (2013, 590–95).) Particularly if  combined with a relaxation of  existing 
bans on racist, anti- Semitic, and homophobic speech, such deregulation of  Islamist 
speech would moderate the signals of  unequal status that are currently sent by the 
widespread failure to regulate caricatures of  the Prophet (PBUH). If  these deregu-
latory changes were accompanied by the rich array of  non- coercive governmental 
efforts to promote egalitarianism that Brettschneider calls for, then the cost to those 
relatively powerless groups who are protected by existing hate speech laws could be 
moderated as well (Brettschneider 2012; see also Gelber 2012).
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The ECtHR could use its Article 10 jurisprudence to force some steps in this 
direction. To the extent that it imposes some consistency on legal regulation of  
hateful speech directed at racial minorities, Jews, Muslims, and LGBT persons, it 
would dampen any signals of  unequal citizenship that are sent by national laws of  
selective scope. To date, the ECtHR has largely failed to do so, and in so failing, 
it has echoed and amplified the signal sent by European states that their Muslim 
minorities are due less than fully equal protection of  the laws.
* * *
The prosecution of  right-wing extremists for saying or writing hateful things that 
fall short of  direct incitements to violence has a number of  potential downsides that 
have been rehearsed by other scholars. Such prosecutions may have a tendency to 
turn the haters into victims and martyrs, and they may sometimes drive hate or-
ganizations underground in ways that make them more difficult to monitor. These 
downsides are counterbalanced by the important symbolic message that the targets 
of  the outlawed speech are full and equal members of  the polity, whose safety and 
status will be protected by the state. But even this upside has a downside, in that 
it signals to other vulnerable groups—those targeted by hateful speech that has 
not been banned—that they are not yet full and equal members. The U.S. First 
Amendment approach, in which hateful speech acts are generally not prosecuted, 
has downsides too, such as forcing all of  us to tolerate pickets at military funerals 
bearing messages like “God Hates Fags” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers.”30 
But U.S. lawmakers are not faced with the European dilemma of  whether to se-
lectively protect some vulnerable groups from hateful speech or to accede to ever- 
proliferating reasonable demands to extend such protection to new and additional 
such groups, with an ever- constricting effect on the scope of  free expression.
The most-cited passage in Waldron’s Holmes Lectures is his objection to white 
liberals’ too easy tolerance of  racist speech, when they are not the ones who have 
to live with its consequences (2012, 33). But one could just as easily invoke civil lib-
ertarians of  color to draw attention to white liberals’ too easy embrace of  speech 
restrictions, when they are not the ones who have to live with the consequences of  
anti- racism campaigns that emphasize words over substance (Gates 1993; M. Malik 
2009; Shaw 2012; see also Greene 2012; Kalven 1965; Walker 1994). The same 
could be said of  LGBT civil libertarians (Eskridge 1999, 318–19; Rubenstein 1992; 
Tatchell 2007). Civil libertarians come in all shapes and sizes, as do advocates of  
30. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
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further government restrictions on speech. The question for all of  us is how best to 
protect the targets of  hatred from violence and discrimination, to integrate them 
into democratic societies, and to signal that all members of  such societies are entitled 
to equal concern and respect. Democratic states should certainly denounce hatred 
of  vulnerable groups wherever and whenever it arises, but it is not clear that they can 
coercively suppress such hatred without sending inegalitarian signals of  their own.
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